Muqtada al-Sadr’s Political Strategy: Iraq’s Shia Leader Positions for a Return to Power
Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the country’s most influential political figures, has once again shaken Iraq’s political landscape by announcing his movement’s boycott of the upcoming November elections. The decision, however, appears to be part of a larger strategy rather than a retreat — a calculated pause aimed at setting the stage for a future comeback on his own terms.
Al-Sadr, who has long balanced religion, populism, and politics, said his goal was to “change the faces and save Iraq.” His statement, delivered last month, comes three years after he dramatically withdrew his parliamentary bloc from Iraq’s legislature in June 2022. The move effectively handed control of the Shia political landscape to the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) — a coalition of Iran-backed parties that quickly filled the power vacuum.
In his announcement, al-Sadr accused the SCF of orchestrating rocket attacks against his supporters and political allies. He framed his boycott as a rejection of corruption and dysfunction, calling for total system reform across Iraq’s political institutions. Yet behind the public rhetoric, reports suggest that back-channel negotiations between the Sadrist movement and the ruling establishment had quietly taken place in an effort to rejoin the electoral race — efforts that ultimately failed.
A Calculated Pause, Not a Withdrawal
Observers note that al-Sadr’s move is not a complete abandonment of politics but a strategic delay. His long-term objective remains the same — forming a government under Sadrist leadership, free from the compromises of Iraq’s sectarian power-sharing system.
A senior source close to al-Sadr, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters that the cleric had faced internal pressure from members of his own movement who feared the boycott was eroding Sadrist influence. These figures argued that participating in elections would protect remaining Sadrist officials within state institutions from political persecution.
Initially resistant, al-Sadr eventually agreed to explore re-entry into the electoral process — on one condition: that the election registration period be extended. His representatives reached out to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, a candidate backed by the SCF, to request the extension.
The SCF swiftly rejected the appeal, unwilling to allow its most formidable rival back into the race. Despite weeks of negotiation, the effort collapsed in July when al-Sadr personally intervened, posting a handwritten message online with the hashtag #Boycotters, abruptly ending talks and reaffirming his decision to sit out the elections.
The 2022 Stalemate: A ‘National Majority’ Blocked
Al-Sadr’s 2022 withdrawal marked the climax of his failed bid to form a so-called “national majority government” — a bold attempt to break Iraq’s entrenched sectarian system known as Muhasasa.
The Muhasasa framework, established after the 2003 US invasion, divides cabinet positions and state resources along ethnic and sectarian lines. While supporters argue it prevents the return of authoritarian rule, critics — including al-Sadr — say it entrenches corruption, weakens accountability, and rewards patronage over competence.
Instead, al-Sadr envisioned a majority government, where the largest coalition would rule while the remaining blocs would serve in opposition — a structure common in parliamentary democracies but virtually unprecedented in post-Saddam Iraq.
To realize this vision, the Sadrists began quietly building alliances months before the October 2021 election. Al-Sadr made a historic outreach to Sunni leader Mohammed al-Halbousi in April, followed by a June meeting with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil.
According to Sadrist insiders, the understanding was clear: “Each party would govern its own region without interference. Together, we would form a government independent of the others, while they could freely form an opposition.”
The strategy initially paid off. The Sadrist Bloc won 73 out of 329 seats, the largest single share in parliament. Al-Sadr then formed a coalition called Inqath Watan (Saving a Homeland) with the KDP (31 seats), al-Halbousi’s Taqadum Movement (37 seats), and several independents — totaling 175 seats, a clear majority.
But just as al-Sadr prepared to form his government, the Federal Supreme Court intervened. At the request of then-President Barham Salih, the court ruled that electing a new president required a two-thirds quorum — effectively raising the threshold for government formation to 220 MPs. This ruling empowered the SCF to create a blocking minority, derailing the Sadrist-led coalition.
The Green Zone Showdown
Frustrated but unwilling to concede, al-Sadr turned to his greatest source of power — the streets. After withdrawing from parliament in mid-2022, the Sadrists organized mass demonstrations in Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone, home to government offices and foreign embassies.
Protesters stormed parliament, setting up a sit-in to demand new elections and the dissolution of parliament. The protests remained largely peaceful until tensions escalated near the headquarters of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) — a state-sponsored coalition of mostly Iran-aligned militias that form the SCF’s military backbone.
The standoff soon turned violent, with armed clashes breaking out between Sadrist supporters and rival factions. Dozens were killed in what became one of Baghdad’s bloodiest internal confrontations since 2019. The violence ended only after al-Sadr delivered a televised speech ordering his followers to withdraw immediately to prevent further bloodshed — a move that reinforced his reputation as both a populist leader and a reluctant peacemaker.
Shifting Power and Future Ambitions
Following the turmoil, the SCF consolidated power. Parliament elected Abdul Latif Rashid of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — the KDP’s long-time rival — as Iraq’s new president. Rashid then tasked Mohammed Shia al-Sudani with forming a government, which swiftly won a vote of confidence.
Al-Sadr’s rivals may have secured control of the government, but his movement remains deeply embedded in Iraq’s social and political fabric. Over nearly two decades, the Sadrists have played a role in every administration since 2006, rebranding under different banners — from the Ahrar Bloc to the Sairoon Alliance, and most recently, the Sadrist Bloc.
Though out of parliament for now, the Sadrists retain significant street power, grassroots loyalty, and a network of clerical and charitable institutions. Many analysts believe al-Sadr’s current boycott is a tactical withdrawal, designed to let his rivals bear the brunt of Iraq’s ongoing crises — from economic stagnation and corruption to deteriorating public services — before making a dramatic return to “save the nation.”
As one Sadrist insider summarized: “Sayyid Muqtada believes time is on his side. He’s letting others fail so that when he returns, Iraqis will see him as the only leader who can deliver real change.”
A Return on His Terms
While Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision to boycott the 2025 elections may seem like retreat, it aligns perfectly with his long-standing political strategy: to remain outside the system until it needs him most. Whether he ultimately re-enters politics or continues as Iraq’s populist outsider, al-Sadr’s influence is unlikely to fade anytime soon.
With the Shia Coordination Framework facing growing public dissatisfaction and the country still plagued by instability, the stage may yet be set for al-Sadr’s return — one that could once again redefine Iraq’s fragile democracy.