Why Ukraine Needs Automatic Security Guarantees—Not Another NATO-Style Promise
As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to evolve, a new idea has been gaining traction in both European and U.S. policy debates — the creation of “Article 5-like” security guarantees for Ukraine. The concept, inspired by the NATO Charter’s famous mutual defense clause, has been endorsed in varying forms by leaders across the West. But while it may sound reassuring on paper, duplicating NATO’s promise without its military structure risks leaving Ukraine vulnerable and Europe no safer.
The Rise of the “Article 5-Like” Idea
In March, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni became the first to publicly suggest a new mechanism modeled after Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which declares that an attack on one member is an attack on all. Her remarks opened the door to a broader debate about how to protect Ukraine without granting it full NATO membership.
By August, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration followed up with its own version — a “U.S. Article 5-type” security framework outside of NATO’s existing command. Then in September, French President Emmanuel Macron gathered 26 European partners in Paris, calling for a post-war “reassurance force” to protect Ukraine once the fighting stops.
On the surface, these proposals suggest growing Western unity. But in reality, they highlight a dangerous illusion: that words alone can deter Moscow. As nightly drone raids, cyberattacks, and maritime sabotage blur the lines of warfare, Ukraine needs an automatic defense mechanism, not another treaty built on political consultations and delayed responses.
Why NATO-Style Promises Are Not Enough
Article 5 remains one of the most powerful deterrents in modern history, but its effectiveness depends on collective political will, not automatic military action. The article requires consultations among member states before any response is decided, leaving each ally free to determine how — or whether — to act.
That process was designed for a 20th-century world of visible aggression — tanks crossing borders, fighter jets bombing cities, and ships exchanging fire at sea. But today’s hybrid warfare tactics often fall below that threshold. Modern attacks are designed to be ambiguous: drones launched from foreign territory, cyber sabotage against infrastructure, or mysterious damage to undersea cables.
This ambiguity creates paralysis. Even within NATO, recent incidents have failed to trigger collective defense because they exist in a legal and political gray zone.
Russia’s Gray-Zone Warfare Is Now Routine
In recent months, Russia’s disruptive activity inside NATO territory has shifted from rare to routine.
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On September 10, two dozen Russian-made drones entered Polish airspace during a large-scale strike on Ukraine. NATO jets intercepted the threats, and Poland invoked Article 4, which allows for consultations but not immediate action.
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Denmark was forced to temporarily shut down multiple airports following repeated drone sightings.
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French naval forces intercepted a tanker suspected of belonging to a Russia-linked “shadow fleet” involved in the drone disruptions.
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Germany reported coordinated drone flights over a refinery, shipyard, and even a university hospital, while Baltic states investigated months of unexplained damage to energy pipelines and undersea cables.
Each of these incidents was serious. Yet none of them crossed the legal line that would have triggered collective defense under NATO rules. This is precisely why copying Article 5 outside NATO would offer Ukraine little more than symbolic reassurance.
Ukraine: From Security Consumer to Security Contributor
When designing a new security framework for Ukraine, Western allies must acknowledge a fundamental shift: Ukraine is no longer just a recipient of protection — it is now a contributor to European security.
After the Polish drone incident, several NATO allies requested Ukrainian expertise in counter-drone warfare. Ukrainian specialists have since traveled to Denmark to train local forces in jamming, sensor integration, and the use of low-cost drone interceptors.
NATO commanders now admit that Europe must learn to defeat drones affordably, rather than wasting missiles that cost hundreds of thousands of euros per strike. This change in mindset underscores that Ukraine’s battlefield experience has become vital to Europe’s own defense.
The Lessons of 1994: Empty Assurances Don’t Work
The debate over new guarantees also evokes a painful memory for Ukraine — the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. In exchange for surrendering the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, Kyiv received political “security assurances” from the U.S., U.K., and Russia. But those promises were never legally binding.
Two decades later, in 2014, Russia seized Crimea and ignited war in Donbas, using unmarked troops to maintain plausible deniability. Even if Ukraine had been a NATO member, the ambiguous nature of that aggression might still have sparked hesitation among allies. Then, in 2022, Russia invaded openly — proving that non-binding pledges and delayed decisions cannot deter a determined aggressor.
What Ukraine and Europe need now is a system that triggers automatic action, not another round of political debate when the next crisis hits.
What Real Security Guarantees Should Look Like
A credible mechanism for Ukraine’s defense must go beyond symbolic language. It needs to be tougher than Article 5 where hybrid threats are concerned — built on five key pillars: automaticity, time, presence, intelligence, and production.
1. Automatic Triggers
The new framework must include legally binding “if-then” clauses. When specific indicators are met — such as state-origin drones or missiles entering Ukrainian airspace, mass drone incursions near the border, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure — an automatic response should activate within hours.
That response must combine military measures and immediate economic sanctions, with consultations serving only to refine the reaction, not to debate whether one should occur at all.
2. Joint Aerial and Maritime Shield
Ukraine’s skies and nearby seas should be treated as a single, integrated defense zone. Allies must maintain persistent radar coverage, maritime patrols, and shared command systems. They should agree in advance on rules for intercepting drones and fuse low-cost interceptors, electronic warfare tools, and directed-energy weapons with traditional air defense systems.
The goal is economic efficiency: make Russian drone attacks costly for Moscow, not for Europe.
3. Visible Presence and Forward Logistics
Security also depends on visible deterrence. Before any ceasefire, allies should establish forward logistics hubs in Poland and Romania, equipped with ammunition, spare parts, and rapid transport links into Ukraine.
After a ceasefire, rotating multinational air defense units, engineers, and maritime patrol teams through Ukrainian ports and bases would ensure that any renewed aggression immediately involves multiple allied capitals — sending a clear signal to Moscow that escalation will not go unanswered.
4. Intelligence Integration
Effective deterrence requires fast and shared intelligence. Allies must move from ad hoc cooperation to a formal intelligence compact with Ukraine. This would integrate satellite imagery, signal intercepts, open-source data, and battlefield sensors into a near-real-time network accessible to all partners.
Rapid attribution of attacks is vital: Ukraine can only defend itself — and deter further strikes — if it can prove who is responsible quickly and credibly.
5. Industrial and Technological Cooperation
Finally, Europe and the U.S. must accelerate joint defense production. Ukraine has developed some of the most innovative drone and electronic warfare technology on the battlefield. By integrating Ukrainian firms into European and American supply chains, allies can strengthen their own defense industries while sustaining Kyiv’s war effort.
Building a System That Acts — Not Just Talks
The reality of modern conflict demands a system that acts automatically, not one that waits for consensus. A copy of Article 5 outside NATO’s integrated command would only create delays — and delays are deadly in today’s hybrid battlefield.
Ukraine has already proven its resilience, innovation, and strategic value to Europe. It deserves a security mechanism that guarantees immediate response, not another promise open to interpretation. As Russia continues to test NATO’s borders and Ukraine’s defenses, Western leaders must choose between symbolic solidarity and real deterrence.
Only a security system built on automatic triggers, real-time intelligence, and visible presence will keep Ukraine — and Europe — truly safe.